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1. Introduction 
 
Sweden has a history of ambitions to build institutions that grant access to 
education for all regardless of income. In this spirit, the higher education 
system is free from tuition fees and there is a system of student grants and 
government loans. The main idea has been to reduce the importance of the 
individual's social background for his/her position later in life. The concept 
of equality of opportunity makes an important distinction between factors 
that the individual is unable to influence and consequences arising as a 
result of choices made by the individual. For example, children cannot 
choose their parents' income or the average income in the neighborhood 
where they live. However, such exogenous circumstances could have a 
constraining effect on their opportunities for earning a high income when 
they are adults. At the same time, the choices that individuals make can 
also influence their income later in life. Theories of equality of opportunity 
are different from theories of equality in that they include the preferences 
of the individual. These preferences could, for example, influence choices 
concerning education, migration and labor supply. 
 
It is not possible to observe all choices or circumstances that might affect 
the individual's income as an adult. One approach to deal with this 
problem is to identify what are likely to be the most important factors 
influencing future income, and then let all the income differences that are 
unexplained by these, to be labelled as effort. Effort is, by assumption, a 
result of choices based on preferences. A dilemma with this way of 
analyzing is that, if too many background factors are included, it would 
mean that very few individuals would have experienced the same 
circumstances. On the other hand, if too few circumstances are included, 
this would leave unexplained income differences that would be labelled as 
effort. 
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The purpose of this study is to evaluate whether a set of circumstances that 
the individual is unable to influence are important for his/her income as an 
adult.
2 The intention is to keep the analysis as close to the concept of 
equality of opportunity as possible. 
 
The theory of equality of opportunity, developed by Roemer (1998, 2002), 
provides an analytical framework within which it is possible to compare 
how different circumstances constrain the opportunities open to the 
individual when the degree of effort is kept constant. Most of the empirical 
literature has analyzed one particular factor, the income of the father, and 
has not focused on keeping the amount of effort exerted by the individual 
constant. Studies of the correlation between the father’s income and that of 
the adult son are common.
3 The purpose of these studies is to examine 
whether children from poor families continue to have a low income as 
adult. The usual result from these studies is that the parents' income is 
positively correlated with the income of the adult child. The magnitude of 
the elasticity varies between different studies and countries.
4 Österberg 
(2000) finds, using a Swedish data set, an elasticity of between 0.125-
0.185, which is relatively low compared with studies for other countries. 
Another finding is that the intergenerational elasticity may vary in 
accordance with different parental income levels. Becker & Tomes (1986) 
suggest that, if low income families are constrained to borrow for 
investments in human capital for their children, the correlation should be 
higher for these families than for families possessing the financial 
resources to invest optimally. The reason is that increased investments in 
                                                                 
2From a practical point of view, these circumstances have to be measurable and available 
in order to be possible to analyze. Note that those characteristics influencing income, 
which the individual can to some extent choose, such as education, are not important in 
the analyses. 
3See Solon, G. (1999) for an excellent survey. 
4See Solon, G. (1999) and Björklund & Jäntti (2000) for an overview of different studies 
and see Björklund & Jäntti (1997) for a comparison of intergenerational income 
correlation in Sweden and in the United States. 
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human capital would lower the marginal rates of return, which would 
eventually reach the market rate on assets. Further increases in income 
would then be invested in assets and given as bequests to the children, 
rather than invested in human capital. 
 
If education is important for income, the Swedish aim of reducing 
inequality of opportunity through access to higher education may reduce, 
or eliminate, the constraint to invest optimally for low income families. If 
no nonlinearities are found, the potential effects of income would not seem 
to work through a constrained investment decision. The income level can, 
however, still be important as the correlation may not necessarily be 
caused by constrained investment behaviour. 
 
This article contributes to the literature on equality of opportunity in the 
following ways. Firstly, a semiparametric model is estimated which does 
not specify the functional form of the parents' income, and the elasticity is 
allowed to vary over their income. Secondly, several factors, not just the 
fathers' income, are included in the analysis. These relate the empirical 
analysis to the theory of equality of opportunity in a more consistent 
manner than has been typically done in the literature. The model also 
handles the dilemma that arises when too few individuals face the same 
conditions when several explanatory variables are included. Individuals 
are compared as if they faced the same circumstances except with regard 
to the dimension that is analyzed in an equality of opportunity-framework. 
The results indicate connections between the circumstances analyzed and 
the income of the adult child, and equality of opportunity clearly does not 
exist. It should, however, be noted that the included variables explain a 
very small part of the variation in income. The results also indicate that no 
specific nonlinearities, that would support a theory of constrained 
investment behavior for low income families in Sweden, are present. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes 
the theoretical framework for equality of opportunity. The data set is 
described in section three. Section four illustrates the econometric 
considerations and introduces the semiparametric model. The results are 
presented in section five and section six consists of some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
This study is based on the theory of equality of opportunity described in 
Roemer's book Equality of Opportunity (1998).
5 The theory is built on a 
few key concepts; circumstances, type and effort, each of which will be 
presented below. 
 
Circumstances are characteristics that the individual cannot influence, and 
therefore, cannot be held responsible for. They could refer to 
characteristics of the family and the neighborhood in which the individual 
grew up, as well as personal traits present from birth. The latter include, 
for example, gender and other possible genetic traits. Family 
characteristics that would support human capital formation might, for 
example, be parental income and the time parents spent with the child, in 
particular helping with homework. Parents' incomes could, for example, 
facilitate the formation of human capital through the purchase of books, 
computers or influence the quality of schooling the child receives. These 
family characteristics may also work through preferences. For example, 
time spent by parents in being supportive of the child's school work is 
likely to encourage his/her preference for education. 
 
                                                                 
5The theory is also described in several different papers such as O'Neill et al. (2000) and 
Roemer (2002). The theory described by Roemer is not the only, nor the first theory of 
equality of opportunity. The theory is, however, suitable to base an empirical analysis on. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  5 
Theoretically, parental income could affect preferences where the standard 
of living in childhood is a reference point for adulthood. A luxurious life in 
childhood could stimulate a demand for a luxurious life later, which would 
require a high income. In a similar fashion, growing up in a low income 
family could induce a different attitude towards the importance of earning 
a lot of money. Occupational choice could, for example, be based on other 
values. Neighborhood characteristics that might influence preferences 
could work through peer pressure, role-models and social norms. Different 
neighborhoods could also have schools of differing quality that affect 
human capital formation. 
 
The circumstances in which the child grows up can, potentially, affect the 
ability to earn a high income in several ways. This means it is, in general, 
difficult to distinguish between, for example, the direct effects of parental 
income on the individual's opportunities and the possible indirect effects of 
that income on preferences. One way to approach this problem is to view 
these kinds of attitudes as a result of inequality of opportunity. It is, 
however, not obvious that income differences due to different preferences, 
following from different circumstances, should be viewed as a state of 
inequality of opportunity. Dworkin (1981), for example, argues that 
differences based on preferences, with which the individual identifies and 
is satisfied, should be ethically acceptable. Taking this view, it becomes 
important to separate the effects of those circumstances that work through 
preferences from the more direct effects, such as investment in human 
capital formation. 
 
Individuals can be classified into different categories, i.e. types, with 
respect to their circumstances, each with their own income distribution. If 
inequality of opportunity exists, then incomes and, ultimately, income 
distributions will be affected by different opportunities. Those types with 
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incomes. The individual's placement in the income distribution for his/her 
type will be the result of a large number of unobserved life events. These 
events could be based on preferences, luck, etc. and, in the equality of 
opportunity-framework they are summarized into a "catch-all" term called 
effort. The income distribution can, accordingly, be seen as a mapping of a 
space of opportunities, hereafter called an indirect opportunity set, in 
which the individual can choose his/her effort and be rewarded with a 
particular income. The opportunity set is indirect because individuals do 
not choose their income, instead they decide the amount of effort they will 
put in and the type of education they will pursue. It is important to 
remember that effort, defined in this way, is also a result of environmental 
characteristics that have not been included in the list of circumstances. 
Controlling for only a few circumstances will naturally be too conservative 
as other relevant factors may possibly be left out. If this is the case, the 
results are likely to indicate that the differences in income are within the 
individual’s scope of choice, even though this is not entirely true. On the 
other hand, including every event in life that is likely to affect income in 
adulthood would, however, change the focus of the analysis from equality 
of opportunity to just equality. The reason is that every individual would 
then constitute a unique type, and consequently all rankings would 
collapse. More specifically, all the differences in income would, 
ultimately, be the result of circumstances. 
 
As explained previously, where an individual ends up within the income 
distribution of a type is the result of differences in effort. Different 
individuals are assumed to have used the same degree of effort if they end 
up in the same percentile of their respective type's distribution. This is an 
important assumption as it enables us, at least in theory, to keep the degree 
of effort constant while changing the circumstances. It allows us to 
investigate the extent to which unfortunate circumstances constrain the 
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2.1 Model 
 
The theory utilized in this paper is based on Roemer (2002) and O'Neill et 
al. (2000). Within the equality of opportunity-framework, the focus in this 
study is on income.
6 The income of individual i is assumed to be 
determined by the following function: 
 
) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( i i t i t i i e y C e y y = =              ( 1 )  
 
 
where yi is the income of individual i, i = 1,…,n and ei is the value of 
relative effort for individual i.  Cti is a vector of circumstances 
corresponding to the type to which i belongs. The income distribution of i's 
type is labelled Gti. Ftieti is the distribution of effort in the type to 
which individual i belongs, where eti is absolute effort. The difference 
between relative and absolute effort is explained below. Note that where i 
is within parentheses, this indicates that i belongs to that type, although i  
is, of course, not the only individual in that type. As every type is assumed 
to consist of a large number of individuals, a single individual cannot 
influence the distribution of effort within its type. The distribution is, 
therefore, a characteristic of i's type in the same way as are the 
circumstances. 
 
Further,  yi  yei,Cti can be written as ytiei, and y is strictly 
increasing in the relative effort, ei. The absolute effort, eti    
ev1,v2,...,vm is a function of a finite number of measurable but, for the 
                                                                 
6In the study, both labor income and disposable income are used as measure of income. 
Using labor income captures the opportunities to earn a high labor income, while 
disposable income is closer to capturing the opportunities to obtain a certain living 
standard. Opportunities, Preferences and Incomes  8 
researcher, unobservable events, v1,v2,...,vm . The efforts are assumed to 
be summarized in a scalar. Note that the effort distributions can be 
different for different types. For some types it is possible that the 
circumstances together with the unobservable events,  m v v v ,..., , 2 1 , make 
the effort distribution to cover fairly low levels of absolute effort. In the 
same way it is possible that different circumstances influence the absolute 
effort positively. Roemer makes, in his theory, a subjective valuation that 
to compare the absolute effort would not be appropriate as certain 
circumstances have made it easier to exert a high level of absolute effort.
7 
For this reason it is necessary to find a relative measure of effort. To 
proceed from here, it is, accordingly, necessary to find some way to 
identify the individual’s relative effort, ei, without knowing the 
unobservable events, v1,v2,...,vm . The Roemer Identification Axiom 
serves this purpose and works in the following manner. 
 
Individuals in different types are assumed, as a definition, to have the same 
relative effort if they are at the same quantile in their types' effort 
distribution. For an individual with an absolute effort of, for example, eti
∗
, 
it is possible to find the corresponding relative effort by looking in the 
effort distribution, Ftieti, of its type. Accordingly, Ftieti  ei, 
where ei ∈ 0,1 and is the quantile within the effort distribution. Thus, it 
is possible that the relative effort, Ftieti  ei, equals a relative effort 
in another type, for example, Ftjetj  ej, even though the absolute 
efforts, eti and etj are different. 
                                                                 
7Dworkin would probably prefer to write yi  yeti,Cti, because then the absolute 
effort, i.e. all the preferences, would be the part that individuals would be responsible for. 
However, the absolute effort is influenced by the circumstances and Roemer does not 
want to keep individuals responsible for preferences that are based on circumstances that 
the individual cannot influence. Hence, the relevant effort is ei  and Cti can influence 
the income both directly and indirectly by influencing preferences. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  9 
This means that, for individual i and individual j  who are in different 
types, 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( j t j j t j t j t i t i t i i t i t e G e F e F e G π π = = = = =      (2) 
 
                                      j i e e =   iff  
 
Ending up in the -th quantile in the income distribution is equivalent to 
ending up in the -th quantile in the distribution of effort. The reason is 
that only effort is assumed to influence the income when the circumstances 
are the same. Thus, individuals in the same quantile in the income 
distribution for their type, have the same level of relative effort, even 
though they may have different incomes. As assumed, once the 
circumstances are controlled for, the rank within the income distribution of 
a type can be used to identify the rank within the effort distribution. This 
means that an individual’s effort is identified through the income 
differences that are left when all circumstances have been controlled for. 
 
With this foundation, the next step is to define the indirect opportunity set. 
This is an illustration of the reachable outcomes for individuals with equal 
opportunities, depending on the level of effort they make. Let the rank 
within the income distribution for the type that  i  belongs to be, 
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Monotonicity enables us to write, 
 
], , [ ] [ ) ( ) ( ) (
1
) ( i t i i t i t i t C e y y G = =
− π          ( 3 )  
 
which is the indirect opportunity set. By varying the amount of relative 
effort, (ei or ), it is possible to influence the income. The opportunity set 
is indirect as it is not possible for the individual to directly choose . 
Income is affected by a large number of life events, such as the choice of 
education and occupation, whether to marry and settle down, to move etc. 
These consequently determine the amount of effort observed in the 
measure,  ei. The intuition behind this indirect opportunity set is that an 
individual makes many different choices that affect his/her income. This 
income is then used to find a measure of effort, which is the rank in the 
income distribution within the type. 
 
The last step before proceeding to the empirical part is to define a situation 
in which there is equality of opportunity. 
 




) ( π π
− − = = G y G i t i t           ( 4 )  
 
Equality of opportunity holds if the income distribution is independent of 
type. The same value of effort would, accordingly, mean the same income, 
even though the types, and thus the circumstances, are different. Equality 
of opportunity is simply characterized by a situation where the 
circumstances do not affect the income. Investigating this issue is the main 
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3. Data 
 
The data set for the analysis consists of the complete cohort of individuals 
in Sweden born 1965. Biological and social parents are identified for each 
individual. Everyone who has been registered as a Swedish resident is 
included. 
 
The data set is based on information from several different registers, which 
are linked and matched by Statistics Sweden. The register used to obtain 
the biological connection between children and parents is the Several 
Generations Register.
8 The longitudinal database, Louise, is used for the 
outcome years 1994-99. Background information for the years 1971, 1974, 
1977, 1980, 1983 comes from the Income and Wealth Register
9, which is a 
register based on taxation. Additional background information, as well as 
connections between children and social parents, comes from the 
Population and Housing Census
10, which is a nationwide census that took 
place 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. Social parents refer to 
parents living with the child, even though they are not necessarily 
biological or adoptive parents. The data are deflated to the 2001 price level 
by using the consumer price index. 
 
The complete data set consists of 153 005 individuals. It is divided into 
two subsamples, consisting of 79 007 males and 73 998 females. 
Individuals who died during the period 1994-99 are excluded from the 
sample as are those whose parents died before 1985. If the analysis is 
performed using the fathers' incomes, only individuals who have the same 
social father identified as the social father for each of the years 1970, 1975 
and 1980, are included in the sample. With these restrictions, 45 699 males 
                                                                 
8In Swedish, Flergenerationsregistret. 
9In Swedish, Inkomst och förmögenhetsregistret. 
10In Swedish, Folk och bostadsräkningen, FoB. Opportunities, Preferences and Incomes  12 
and 42 918 females are included with their fathers. If the income of both 
parents is analyzed, the same social parents had to be identified for each of 
the years 1970, 1975 and 1980, in order for the individual to be included. 
43 301 males and 41 027 females remain in the sample when families with 
both parents present are analyzed. 
 
It is obvious that, as a consequence of using these criteria for selecting the 
samples, the final data sets consist, to a large extent, of nuclear families. 
Descriptive statistics of the family characteristics, as well as information 
about the neighborhood, can be found in Table 1. The variables are 
measured several times during the individual's childhood and averages are 
used in the estimations.
11 Factors that are connected to the neighborhood 
are all measured at the parish level.
12 On average, a parish includes about 
3200 individuals, although the variation is substantial. At this level, the 
average income among 30-60 years old is used as well as the percentage of 
individuals aged 30-60 years who earned less than 50 % of the median 
income. Additional variables describing circumstances are, for example, 
the percentage of individuals in employment, the percentage of female 
headed households with children and the percentage of individuals who 
own their own home living in the parish. Similar variables to those used in 






                                                                 
11Most of the early empirical literature on intergenerational income mobility used the 
income for a specific year, but if interest is focused on estimating the effects of long-run 
income status, or permanent income, this yields an error-in-variables bias toward zero 
(Zimmerman, 1992). Traditionally, averaging the income over several years or using out 
of equation instruments are the methods used to reduce this bias. In this study, the income 
of the parents is averaged over 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980 and 1983. 
12A parish is originally a geographical division related to the church, but it is a suitable 
level of analysis as it is much smaller than a municipality. Using the average of data for a 
municipality could, for example, hide important differences within the area. 
13See for example Ginther et al. (2000) for a survey of the effects of neighborhoods. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  13 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics                
Sample  Male       Female   
Statistics Mean  Std.    Mean  Std. 
Variables     errors        errors 
        
Labor income (ln), average 1994-99  11.9140 1.0331    11.3720 1.0655 
Disposable income (ln), average 1994-99  11.8690 0.4291    11.7380 0.3721 
Combined annual income (ln), father and mother  12.5990 0.3844    12.6030 0.3856 
    average 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983           
Combined annual income (ln), father  12.2720 0.4150    12.2750 0.4193 
    average 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983           
Social mother (1970, 1975, 1980) is biological mother (dummy = 1)  0.9427  0.2325    0.9490  0.2200 
Mother is foreign born (dummy = 1)  0.0775  0.2674    0.0815  0.2736 
Age of mother 1971  32.8170 5.8353    32.754  5.8146 
Social father (1970, 1975, 1980) is biological father (dummy = 1)  0.8002  0.3999    0.7827  0.4124 
Father is foreign born (dummy = 1)  0.0801  0.2714    0.0799  0.2711 
Age of father 1971  36.182  6.6366    36.226  6.6829 
Child did not stay with social parent 1985 (dummy = 1)  0.1859  0.3890    0.3211  0.4669 
Number of social siblings, average over 1970, 1975 and 1980  1.3815  0.8704    1.3848  0.8793 
Number of social sisters, average over 1970, 1975 and 1980  0.6497  0.6688    0.6575  0.6969 
Mother divorced (was married 1971, 1974, 1977 or 1980, and  0.1345  0.3412    0.1440  0.3511 
    later divorced) (dummy = 1)           
Father divorced (was married 1971, 1974, 1977 or 1980, and  0.0651  0.2467    0.0581  0.2340 
    later divorced) (dummy = 1)           
Owner (dummy = 1 if the owner of the home   0.3847  0.4865    0.3721  0.4834 
    lives in household)           
Mother received social assistance, 1983 (dummy = 1)  0.0442  0.2056    0.0441  0.2053 
Father received social assistance, 1983 (dummy = 1)   0.0252  0.1567    0.0244  0.1543 
Mother unemployed (dummy = 1 if mother received money  0.0950  0.2932    0.0957  0.2942 
    due to unemployment 1974, 1977, 1980 or 1983)           
Father unemployed (dummy = 1 if father received money  0.0920  0.2890    0.0921  0.2891 
    due to unemployment 1974, 1977, 1980 or 1983)           
Combined annual income (ln), average of 30-60 years old in  12.0070 0.1326    12.0070 0.1318 
    parish (that mother lived), average 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983           
Combined annual income (ln), average of 30-60 years old in  12.0020 0.1352    12.0010 0.1350 
    parish (that father lived), average 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983           
Share working, percent in parish, average 1970, 1975 and 1980  46.5140 3.3883    46.5090 3.3829 
Female headed household with a child, percent in parish   4.0475  2.0452    4.0422  2.0335 
    average 1970, 1975, 1980           
Share of population in parish that was foreign citizen  5.0584  4.3825    5.0753  4.3966 
    average 1970, 1975, 1980           
Owner, percent in parish where the owner of the home lives  49.7210 22.1340    49.4950 22.0830
    in household, average 1970, 1975, 1980           
Poverty measure; share with less than 50% of median income in  24.5340 3.1901    24.5170 3.1832 
    parish (mothers), average (1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983), percent            
Poverty measure; share with less than 50% of median income in  24.7180 3.2486    24.7170 3.2552 
    parish (fathers), average (1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983), percent            
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Two different measures of income for the individual are used in the 
empirical part. The first measure is the average of the labor income for the 
years 1994-99. Equality of opportunity refers, in this case, to the 
possibility to earn a high labor income. Here opportunities indicate a more 
direct connection to productivity. The second income measure that is used 
is the average disposable income for the same years. In this case, the 
opportunities refer to reaching a high living standard after tax. 
 
4. Econometric model 
 
This econometric section describes how to illustrate the indirect 
opportunity sets. Following the theory of equality of opportunities, the first 
step consists of modelling the outcome variable as a function of 
circumstances and individual effort. However, in order to illustrate the 
opportunity sets, it is necessary to reduce the dimension along which the 
opportunities are compared. This is done within the econometric model, by 
estimating yi  yei,Ctypei.  
 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature concerning intergenerational 
income mobility suggest that there may be a nonlinear relationship 
between the income of the father and the income of the child as an adult. 
(Becker & Tomes, 1986 and Corak & Heisz, 1999). This nonlinearity is 
allowed for by estimating a semiparametric model. In addition, a 
parametric model is also estimated. The semiparametric model will be 
described first. Then, based on the semiparametric model, an explanation 
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4.1 Semiparametric model 
 
Becker & Tomes (1986) suggest that there is a higher correlation between 
the incomes of parents and adult children for low-income families. This 
arises from borrowing constraints when it comes to the parents' human 
capital investments in their children. Using a nonparametric technique and 
Canadian data, Corak & Heisz (1999) find empirically an inverted V-
pattern for the income elasticity. They suggest that this can be explained 
by a borrowing constraint and a positive relation between the ability of the 
children and the income of the parents.
14 As mentioned in the introduction, 
in the Swedish case, where higher education is free from tuition fees and 
there is a system of student grants and government loans, there seems to be 
a relatively lower risk for families to be constrained in their investment 
behavior in their children’s human capital. However, for Swedish data, 
Österberg (2000) indicates nonlinearities by estimating the probability for 
the son to end up in a certain decile of the income distribution given the 
father's status. The highest income classes are reported as the least socially 
mobile. The method used is, however, different from estimating a 
nonlinear elasticity. 
 
Bearing the previously mentioned literature in mind, it is appropriate to 
estimate the effects of parental income without assuming a particular 
functional form and allowing the income elasticity to vary according to the 
parental income.  
 
                                                                 
14The argument is that low income parents would have low ability children, who would 
get an optimal investment in human capital. The elasticity should thus be low. For 
families with higher incomes, the children would have a higher ability. Even though the 
income is higher, the extra income would not fully cover the extra funds needed to invest 
in human capital, to produce an optimal investment. The elasticity would thus be higher. 
Families with even higher incomes would, however, have enough money to invest 
optimally, even though the children would have an even higher ability. The elasticity 
would, accordingly, be lower again. 
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A nonlinear specification is, 
 
i i i e C m y + = ) (          ( 5 )  
 
where  Ci is a vector of the circumstances that the individual cannot 
influence.  ei is the effort in the model. As individuals only receive a 
positive labor income when they participate in the labor market and 
actually have a job, there are individuals with no labor income at all in a 
specific year. This occurs both when the individuals decide not to 
participate in the labor market or when they do, but are unemployed. All 
income variables are measured in logarithms and, accordingly, only 
observations with positive incomes for both the adult child and the 
father/parents are included.
15 As (5) applies for the full sample, excluding 
observations with no income, should require some adjustments to the 
estimation procedure. An option would be to estimate a Tobit-model. 
However, as the income is averaged over a period of years, it is assumed 
that the potential problems using a standard procedure are limited. 
Inference is, of course, only possible with respect to the population with a 
positive income. 
 
The curse of dimensionality refers to the slow convergence of 
nonparametric estimators when additional regressors are included. Due to 
this problem, the Ci variables are separated into a linear part, consisting of 
variables with parameters that are estimated parametrically, while a 
nonlinear part is estimated nonparametrically. The semiparametric model 
is described in Robinson (1988).  
 
 
                                                                 
15The problem of zero income is, of course, more common when labor income is used as 
the output variable than when disposable income is used. Of course, parents with zero 
income also exclude observations, when the logarithm of income is used. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  17 
The model separates the nonlinear effect of (5), into a linear and a 
nonlinear part, 
 
i i i i e z m x y + + = ) ( β         ( 6 )  
    
where zi and xi are circumstances beyond the control of individuals. zi is 
the income of the parents, and xi is other circumstances for which it is 
important to control. ei is the individually specific effect, which 
corresponds to effort in theory. ei, in equation (6) is assumed to be 
independent of the explanatory variables.
16  is a vector of parameters and 
the functional form of m is unknown. The semiparametric estimation of 
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where  Ri
yz  yi − Eyi ∣ zi and Ri
xz  xi − Exi ∣ zi. With this 



































β       ( 7 )  
 
To make the estimation of 
∧
SP feasible,  Eyi ∣ zi and Exi ∣ zi are 
replaced by nonparametric estimates. This is done by using local linear 
                                                                 
16Abul Naga, R. (2002) pays regard to the potential problem caused if this assumption is 
invalid. For example, if the ability and effort of the parents are transferred, through genes 
and/or behavior, to the ability and effort of the child, this could imply a correlation. In this 
study, a fairly large vector of control variables, in addition to the parental income, is used. 
A sensitivity analysis is also included in the results section. 
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regressions. 
∧
Ii is an indicator function to avoid division by zero. 
(
∧
Ii  1|fi| b, where b is a small value, here set to 0.001 and fi is the 
density function of z.) The nonparametric part of (6), mz and its 
derivative, is estimated by means of a local linear regression of   
y∗  yi − 
∧




SP . The procedure can be 
summarized in three steps. 
 
1. Estimate Eyi ∣ zi and Exi ∣ zi nonparametrically for all xi, and 




2. Estimate equation (7) and calculate y∗  yi −  
∧
yi . 
3. Estimate y∗  mzi nonparametrically. 
 
The semiparamtric estimator of the derivative of mzi is, 
 
) / )     (( )   (
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= γ        ( 8 )  
      
A gaussian kernel is used with the bandwidth, h, which is estimated using 
Scott's rule of thumb (Scott, 1992, page 152).





 n−1/5, where 
∧
 is the estimated standard deviation 
of  z, and n is the number of individuals.
18 This semiparametric model 
results in estimates for each coefficient of the parametric part. Further, the 
                                                                 
17See the appendix for a specification of the gaussian kernel. 
18As seen in the formula, Scott's rule of thumb increases the bandwidth with the standard 
deviation, and decreases with the number of observations. The bandwidth is fixed over 
the whole sample, which can give a too small bandwidth in the ends of the distribution 
where there are few observations. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  19 
model results in estimates in each z. Together these constitute the 
derivative of the nonlinear part in (6). The indirect opportunity sets can 
easily be calculated based on this model. 
 
4.2 Estimation of indirect opportunity sets 
 
A central part of the theory of equality of opportunity is the distinction 
between choices and circumstances that restrict the individual’s 
opportunities. To compare the income of individuals living in different 
circumstances, but making a similar effort, it is, therefore, important to 
estimate conditional indirect opportunity sets. O'Neill et al. (2000) 
illustrate opportunity sets using two different methods. The first uses a 
bivariate kernel density of the fathers’ incomes on the incomes of the 
children as adults. The second method is to extract those fathers who have 
similar incomes and then rank the adult children according to their own 
income. The extraction could, for example, be fathers belonging to 
percentile 25, 50 and 75. Within each of these groups, the adult children 
would be ranked based on their own income.
19 To ease the interpretation, 
the outcome variable is divided by the mean for the sample. With 
opportunity sets, it is easy to compare the outcome of individuals with 
different circumstances but with the same rank within their type. 
 
As the income distribution of parents and the adult children is rather 
compressed in Sweden, a bivariate kernel density did not give an 
illustrative figure of the opportunity sets.
20 The second method is, thus, 
applied instead. The difference compared with O'Neill, et al. (2000) is, 
however, that the illustration is done with z and y∗, instead of just the 
                                                                 
19The ranking is made by ordering the observations, starting with the lowest income. The 
rank is also normalized to go from 0 to 100. 
20The density is very high in a small area, and the figure of the density is a very sharp 
peak rather than a hill. This is the case even when a large proportion of the density is cut 
away to scale the figure into something interpretable. Opportunities, Preferences and Incomes  20 
incomes of the adult child y. Since y∗    yi − xi
∧
SP , the indirect 
opportunity sets are conditional on all the variables in x. As y∗ is 
measured in logarithmic form, it is transformed back before being 
analyzed.  y∗∗  ey∗
 Note that these indirect opportunity sets are 
conditional on the variables that are included parametrically and also on 
the income of the parents.
21 This makes the assumption that all relevant 
circumstances are included a little bit more convincing. In O'Neill et al. 
(2000) only the income of the father was included as a circumstance, and 
the rest of the variation in income was labelled as effort. Accordingly, this 
was interpreted as within the scope of the choice of the individual. The 
model used in this study has permitted the opportunity sets to be estimated 
without sorting the population into a tremendous number of groups which, 
even with a huge data set, could contain too few observations. 
 
With this method, it is of course not possible to test all the circumstances 
at once. The method is instead a way of illustrating different opportunities 
arising from differences in one specific circumstance at each time, while 
keeping all the other circumstances constant. The researcher has, thus, to 
decide which circumstance to illustrate. The regression described in the 
previous section tests whether circumstances affect income. However, it 
does not illustrate the differences in incomes, while keeping the degree of 
effort constant, as in the theory. This is an addition to the analysis obtained 
by estimating the indirect opportunity sets. 
 
                                                                 
21To get the indirect opportunity set for children with parents in the 25th percentile, the 
incomes of the parents are ranked and those who are included in the 25th percentile are 
extracted. Then y**/mean is ranked for the children, where the mean refers to the mean of 
y** for the total population. The opportunity set for individuals with parents in the 75th 
percentile is done in the same way. Finally, the results are plotted together. The variables 
in  x are kept constant in y**, and the extraction takes care of the differences in the 
parents' income. 
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5. Results 
 
This section presents the results from the estimations. It is, however, 
important to remember that the individual specific effect is estimated using 
a particular set of circumstances. It is, of course, debatable whether enough 
circumstances, or even the correct circumstances, are included in the 
analysis. In the final part of this section, this issue is investigated briefly 
by using information on siblings. If, for example, innate ability is 
important for income, this should be included in the vector of 
circumstances, since the individuals cannot choose their genes. Innate 
ability and other unobserved circumstances that are not shared by the 
siblings are not included in the analysis. All these unobserved factors are, 
accordingly, sorted into effort. 
 
The analysis is performed in three different steps. First the hypothesis that 
equality of opportunity exists is tested by including the circumstances in 
an OLS regression of the labor income. The next step is to include the 
parents' income nonparametrically to allow for a possible nonlinear 
relation. Finally, indirect opportunity sets are calculated and different 
circumstances are compared keeping the rank constant. These three steps 
are also performed using disposable income as the outcome variable. 
 
5.1 Labor income as dependent variable 
 
Table 2 illustrates semiparametric estimation as well as the OLS 
estimation using labor income as the dependent variable for both the male 
and female samples. The different circumstances influence the income of 
the adult child and equality of opportunity clearly does not exist.  
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At the same time, it can be noted from the fairly small  adj R −
2  that the 
circumstances only explain a small part of the variation in income in 
adulthood. 
 
As the choice of where the parents decide to live is potentially 
endogenous, the coefficient of neighborhood variables should be 
interpreted with caution.
22 A significant coefficient should not be 
interpreted as having a causal impact on the labor income of the adult 
child. It should rather be seen as correlation. 
 
Variables indicating a stable family relationship, for example, if both 
social parents are the child's biological parents, seem to be important for 
labor income. Having a divorced mother appears to significantly influence 
the child's labor income in adulthood. The magnitude of the coefficient 
should, however, be interpreted keeping in mind the selection criteria of 
the samples. Social fathers (and mothers) are in this empirical part 
included if the child was living with them during each of the years 1970, 
1975 and 1980. This implies, of course, that most of the families did not 










                                                                 
22It is possible that parents who pay a lot of attention in the upbringing of their child, also 
value a good neighborhood highly. Whether it is the good neighborhood, or the attention, 
that is important is, however, not separated. 
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Table 2. Estimates. Dependent variable: Labor income (ln) (average, 1994-99) 
Sample  Male         Female       
Model OLS  Robinson    OLS    Robinson 
Variables                     
            
Combined annual income (ln),   0.2979***  Fig. 1a  0.2248***    Fig. 2a 
     father and mother  (0.0149)   (0.0157)    
Social mother (1970, 1975, 1980) is   0.1502**  0.1479**  0.1744**    0.1764** 
    biological mother  (0.0663)   (0.0677)  (0.0690)    (0.0706) 
Mother is foreign born  -0.0412*  -0.0435  -0.0394*    -0.0402* 
  (0.0211)   (0.0216)  (0.0219)    (0.0224) 
Age of mother 1971  0.0012  0.0011  0.0045***    0.0041* 
  (0.0015)   (0.0016)  (0.0016)    (0.0017) 
Social father (1970, 1975, 1980) is   0.2035***  0.2010***  0.1736***    0.1699*** 
    biological father  (0.0432)   (0.0441)  (0.0458)    (0.0469) 
Father is foreign born  -0.0427*  -0.0431**  -0.0458**    -0.0462** 
  (0.0212)   (0.0217)  (0.0225)    (0.0231) 
Age of father 1971  -0.0056*** -0.0053*** -0.0022    -0.0023 
  (0.0013)   (0.0013)  (0.0014)    (0.0014) 
Child did not stay with   -0.1132*** -0.1129*** -0.1111***    -0.1096*** 
    social parent 1985  (0.0139)   (0.0142)  (0.0116)    (0.0119) 
Number of social siblings   -0.0178**  -0.0147**  -0.0593***    -0.0590*** 
  (0.0071)   (0.0073)  (0.0077)    (0.0080) 
Number of social sisters   -0.0043  -0.0041  0.0344***    0.0346*** 
  (0.0088)   (0.0090)  (0.0092)    (0.0095) 
Mother divorced    -0.1625*** -0.1648**  -0.0670**    -0.0682** 
  (0.0254)   (0.0260)  (0.0267)    (0.0273) 
Owner (dummy = 1 if the owner   0.0274**  0.0287**  0.0834***    0.0798*** 
     of the home lives in household)  (0.0112)   (0.0115)  (0.0118)    (0.0122) 
Mother received social   -0.2969*** -0.2869*** -0.3107***    -0.3102*** 
     assistance, 1983  (0.0341)   (0.0350)  (0.0360)    (0.0370) 
Mother experienced unemployment    0.0050  0.0015  -0.0505***    -0.0472** 
    (dummy = 1)  (0.0179)   (0.0184)  (0.0190)    (0.0195) 
Father experienced unemployment  -0.0727*** -0.0695*** -0.0404**    -0.0330* 
    (dummy = 1)  (0.0177)   (0.0182)  (0.0188)    (0.0193) 
Combined annual income (ln),   0.2048***  0.2097***  0.0969*    0.0756 
     average in parish  (0.0534)   (0.0548)  (0.0567)    (0.0584) 
Share working, percent in parish     0.0086***  0.0087***  0.0029    0.0026 
  (0.0023)   (0.0024)  (0.0025)    (0.0025) 
Female headed household with   -0.0072*  -0.0080*  -0.0038    -0.0045 
      a child, percent in parish  (0.0043)   (0.0044)  (0.0046)    (0.0047) 
Share of population in parish that   0.0026*  0.0026  0.0015    0.0014 
     was foreign citizen  (0.0016)   (0.0016)  (0.0016)    (0.0017) 
Owner of the home,   0.0004  0.0004  0.0002    0.0001 
     percent in parish  (0.0004)   (0.0004)  (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
Poverty measure      0.0070**  0.0078***  -0.0019    -0.0024 
  (0.0028)   (0.0028)  (0.0029)    (0.0030) 
Constant 5.0503***    7.0090***     
   (0.6084)         0.6480       
N 39057  39019  36501    36477 
R-sq, adj.  0.0294    0.0250     
Note: Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1%-level are marked with     
*, ** and ***. Standard errors are included in the second row for each estimated parameter. Opportunities, Preferences and Incomes  24 
In the semiparametric model, parental income is the nonparametric part. 
Accordingly, it does not give a single measure of the elasticity, but rather a 
continuous measure of elasticities. The elasticities displayed in Figures 1a 
and 2a correspond to columns 2 and 4 in Table 2. All figures can be found 
on the last pages.  
 
Note that 98 percent of the observations of the logarithm of the combined 
annual income of the parents are included between 11.6 and 13.6 in 
Figures 1a and 2a.
23 The confidence interval, for each estimated elasticity, 
is estimated as plus two standard deviations and minus two standard 
deviations. The confidence bands are, however, underestimated and 
interpretations should be made with caution. This is because the variance 
for each elasticity is estimated without taking into account that  yi
∗ also is 
estimated. See the appendix for details concerning this issue. There is no 
pattern of elasticities with regard to the incomes of the parents. 
Accordingly, the Swedish case does not appear to support the hypothesis 
in Becker & Tomes (1986) that there is a constraint on investment 
behavior in human capital formation for low income parents. The inverted 
V-pattern found by Corak & Heisz (1999) for Canadian data, does not 
apply for Swedish data. The pattern of immobility found by Österberg 
(2000) does not appear in the estimation of nonlinear elasticities. The 
method, however, answers different questions. Österberg (2000) 
investigated the probability of a child ending up in a certain decile given 
the parents' income decile. The nonparametric estimations of the elasticity 
indicate the expected consequence of a one-percent increase/decrease in 
the parents' income, given the level of the parental income. Since no 
nonlinearity of parent's incomes is found, the OLS estimates can be used 
                                                                 
23The reason that the elasticity seems to vary more at the ends of the distribution is 
because of the constant bandwidth chosen with Scott's rule of thumb. The bandwidth is 
probably too small at the ends of the distribution, and the estimates accordingly appear to 
be under smoothed. 
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for interpreting how different characteristics are connected to labor income 
in adulthood. 
 
The analysis presented above is carried out using the parents' combined 
annual income. The literature on intergenerational income correlation has, 
to a large extent, focused on estimating elasticities with respect to the 
father's income. In order to make a comparison with this literature, the 
models are estimated using the fathers' income instead of the parental 
income. The results can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The 
elasticity of the fathers' income is higher than the elasticity found 
previously by Österberg (2000) (0.125-0.185) for the father-son 
relationship in Sweden.
24 This is expected as the social parents are used in 
this study rather than the formal guardianship that was registered at the 
birth of the child.
25 However, adding more background variables typically 
reduces the elasticity of the fathers' income. 
 
5.2 Disposable income as the dependent variable 
 
Using labor income as the dependent variable answers questions about 
whether, and to what extent, circumstances constrain the individual’s 
opportunities to acquire a high labor income in adulthood. As always, the 
results are estimated for a particular period and for particular public 
policies. Public policies can, thus, make different circumstances more or 
less important. The system of taxes and subsidies does, of course, affect 
the income distribution after taxation. Using disposable income instead of 
                                                                 
24Table A1 and Figures 5a and 6a are difficult to compare with Österberg (2000) as no 
single measure of the elasticity is presented. The OLS regressions corresponding to 
columns two and four give, however, the elasticity 0.282 for the male sample and 0.190 
for the female sample. 
25Björklund & Chadwick (2003) study this issue for Swedish data. The elasticity is found 
to be "generally insignificantly different from zero" for sons who never lived with their 
biological fathers.  
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labor income, allows the after tax effects to be investigated. However, 
using disposable income also allows for inequality of opportunity arising 
from incomes other than those from labor. Incomes from capital are, for 
example, included in the income measure. 
 
With the change of the dependent variable from labor income to 
disposable income, the coefficient of the different circumstances shrinks in 
magnitude. This is natural since the distribution of disposable income is 
more compressed than the distribution of labor income. Some of the 
variables are, however, not even significantly different from zero. The tax 
system does not only reduce after tax inequality, it also reduces the 
connection between circumstances and later income. Table 3 shows the 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from the semiparametrical model. 
Figures 3a and 4a show the nonparametric part. Estimates using the 
fathers' income instead of the family income can be found in Table A1 in 
the appendix.
26 No particular nonlinear pattern can be found either with the 
parents' income or with the fathers' income. 
 
It is notable that some of the circumstances that matter for labor income do 
not seem to matter at all when it comes to disposable income. For females, 
the coefficients for the biological father, number of siblings, divorced 
mother, whether the mother received social assistance, and unemployment 
of either parent are not significantly different from zero. In the case of 
women, not living with their social parents at the age of 20, actually means 
that they have a significantly higher disposable income. When labor 
income was analyzed, the corresponding coefficient was negative. For the 
male sample, the corresponding coefficient is significantly negative for 
both income measures. 
  
                                                                 
26The OLS counterpart estimates 0.161 as the elasticity for the male sample, and 0.07 for 
the female sample. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  27 
Table 3. Estimates. Dependent variable: Disposable income (ln) (average, 1994-99) 
Sample  Male         Female       
Model OLS  Robinson    OLS   Robinson 
Variables            
            
Combined annual income (ln),   0.1739***  Fig. 3a  0.0955***    Fig. 4a 
    father and mother  (0.0061)   (0.0057)    
Social mother (1970, 1975, 1980) is   0.1042***  0.1028***  0.0406    0.0406 
    biological mother  (0.0270)   (0.0275)  (0.0248)    (0.0250) 
Mother is foreign born  -0.0088  -0.0087  -0.0037    -0.0032 
  (0.0086)   (0.0088)  (0.0080)    (0.0080) 
Age of mother 1971  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0007    -0.0008 
  (0.0006)   (0.0006)  (0.0006)    (0.0006) 
Social father (1970, 1975, 1980) is   0.0533***  0.0540***  -0.0119    -0.0127 
    biological father  (0.0176)   (0.0179)  (0.0165)    (0.0166) 
Father is foreign born  -0.0324*** -0.0316*** -0.0222***    -0.0216*** 
  (0.0087)   (0.0088)  (0.0082)    (0.0082) 
Age of father 1971  -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0009*    -0.001** 
  (0.0005)   (0.0006)  (0.0005)    (0.0005) 
Child did not stay with   -0.0232*** -0.0237*** 0.0355***    0.0360*** 
    social parent 1985  (0.0057)   (0.0058)  (0.0042)    (0.0043) 
Number of social siblings   -0.0074*** -0.0077**  0.0018*    0.0002 
  (0.0029)   (0.0030)  (0.0028)    (0.0029) 
Number of social sisters   -0.0034  -0.0033**  0.0056    0.0056 
  (0.0036)   (0.0037)  (0.0034)    (0.0034) 
Mother divorced    -0.0603*** -0.0594*** -0.0009    -0.0004 
  (0.0104)   (0.0106)  (0.0097)    (0.0098) 
Owner (dummy = 1 if the owner   0.0202***  0.0197***  0.0174***    0.0151*** 
    of the home lives in household)  (0.0046)   (0.0047)  (0.0043)    (0.0044) 
Mother received social   -0.0977*** -0.1001*** 0.0144    0.0103 
    assistance, 1983  (0.0136)   (0.0139)  (0.0128)    (0.0130) 
Mother experienced unemployment    -0.0079  -0.0077  0.0128    0.0155** 
    (dummy = 1)  (0.0073)   (0.0075)  (0.0069)    (0.0070) 
Father experienced unemployment   -0.0235*** -0.0240*** 0.0025    0.0045 
    (dummy = 1)  (0.0073)   (0.0074)  (0.0068)    (0.0069) 
Combined annual income (ln),   0.1220***  0.1203***  0.0938***    0.0798*** 
    average in parish  (0.0218)   (0.0223)  (0.0206)    (0.0209) 
Share working, percent in parish     0.0035***  0.0035***  0.0002    -2E-05 
  (0.0009)   (0.0010)  (0.0009)    (0.0009) 
Female headed household with   -0.0034*  -0.0033*  0.0034**    0.0036** 
     a child, percent in parish  (0.0017)   (0.0018)  (0.0017)    (0.0017) 
Share of population in parish that   0.0020***  0.0021***  0.0010    0.0010 
    was foreign citizen  (0.0006)   (0.0007)  (0.0006)    (0.0006) 
Owner of the home,   0.0004***  0.0004***  0.0002    0.0002* 
    percent in parish  (0.0002)   (0.0002)  (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Poverty measure      0.0033***  0.0032***  0.0005    -0.0001 
  (0.0011)   (0.0012)  (0.0011)    (0.0011) 
Constant 7.9218***    9.3627***     
   (0.2490)        (0.2355)       
N 40211  40171  37492    37468 
R-sq, adj.  0.0426         0.0165       
Note: Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1%-level are marked with        
*, ** and ***. Standard errors are included in the second row for each estimated parameter. Opportunities, Preferences and Incomes  28 
Some of the background factors seem to be connected in different ways for 
men and women. It could, therefore, be interesting to test whether the 
differences are indeed significant. Simple F-tests reveal that if the mother 
is divorced, received social assistance, and if the child was living with a 
social parent at the age of 20, are clearly connected to the disposable 
income in different ways for the male and female samples. The 
background factors seem to be less important for the female sample's 
disposable income. 
 
5.3 Illustration of Indirect Opportunity Sets 
 
Estimating the indirect opportunity sets is an attempt to illustrate 
inequality of opportunities, and also to incorporate the individual's effort in 
the analysis. 
 
Figure 1b (and 1c)
27 is the indirect opportunity sets for men whose parents 
belong to the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the income distribution. 
Figure 2b (and 3c) presents the female counterpart. These figures can be 
analyzed in two different ways. The figures show how much effort is 
required to achieve the average labor income, (i.e. y**/mean = 1), when 
the individual has parents belonging to 25th or 75th percentile of the 
income distribution. To reach the average income, a man with parents in 
the 25th percentile has to be ranked approximately 52.3 out of 100. For 
men with parents in the 75th percentile the rank of 42.6 is sufficient to 
achieve the mean income.
 28 The necessary rankings for the female sample 
are 56.8 and 50.8 respectively.
29  
                                                                 
27Figure 1b illustrates all individuals, while Figure 1c is a close-up, in which individuals 
at either end of the distribution are cut away. This is done in order to make the figure 
easier to read. The same applies for Figure 3c and all the other indirect opportunity sets. 
The complete figures of the opportunity sets can be requested from the author. 
28The results from the estimated models are summarized in Tables A2 and A3. The 
figures, however, include much more information. 
29Note that the male and female samples are analyzed separately. The necessary rankings Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  29 
O'Neill et al. (2000) estimated, for a small male sample, a necessary rank 
of 70 for children with fathers belonging to the 25th percentile. On the 
other hand, children with fathers belonging to the 75th percentile only 
needed a rank of 40 to reach the average income. 
 
Another way to use the opportunity sets in the analysis is to investigate 
how different circumstances affect the income, when the level of effort is 
held constant. If the rank is fixed at 50, the male with parents in the 75th 
percentile has 9.6 % higher income.
30 The counterpart for the female 
sample is 6.0 %.
31 O'Neill et al. (2000) calculate this relationship when the 
level of effort is kept at 10. In this case, children from families in the 75th 
percentile were expected to earn 56 % more. These calculated differences, 
between the different types, obviously vary depending on which level of 
effort is investigated. Even though there are substantial differences, both in 
terms of data and method, compared with the study by O'Neill et al. 
(2000), the Swedish case seems to be relatively closer to equality of 
opportunity. 
 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is performed to see whether the distributions 
are significantly different depending on the different opportunities. For the 
male sample, the test finds that the zero hypothesis of equality of the 
distribution can be rejected at a 1 percent significance level. If the test is 
performed separately for above and below y**/mean = 1, the results 
indicate that the difference only applies above the average labor income.  
 
For the female sample, the test cannot, at any reasonable significance 
level, reject that the distributions are equal. This indicates that the 
difference in opportunities for earning a high labor income, for the female 
                                                                 
for the female sample are, accordingly, to achieve the mean income among woman. These 
results are also included in Table A2 in the appendix. 
30((1.0701/0.9760)-1)*100  ≈ 9.6%. These numbers are also found in Table A3 in the 
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sample, is not that different for individuals with parents in the 25th 
percentile and the 75th percentile.
32 
 
The opportunity sets illustrate inequality of opportunities with regard to 
parental income when all the circumstances in the regression are taken into 
account. This makes the assumption, required by the theory, that an 
individual can freely choose how much effort he/she exerts, more reliable 
than if the opportunity sets for the parents' incomes were analyzed without 
these variables. Note that the opportunity sets only analyze parental 
incomes. If opportunities with respect to other variables are to be 
investigated, then these variables would have to be treated differently. 
 
The indirect opportunity sets presented so far have illustrated different 
opportunities arising from differences in parental income. It is possible to 
illustrate indirect opportunity sets with respect to other circumstances as 
well. For example, Figure 9, illustrates indirect opportunity sets for 
individuals in the male sample, who had parents within the first decile of 
the income distribution and had, or had not, a mother receiving social 
assistance in 1983. As social assistance is the focus of the analysis, y** is 
adjusted so that the effect of social assistance is not deducted from the 
income of the child. Accordingly y∗ is estimated as y∗   yi − xi
∧
SP , 
where neither the dummy variable nor the coefficient for whether or not 




Figure 9 illustrates that whether or not the mother received social 
assistance is a more important factor when the individual's level of effort is 
                                                                 
31((0.9937/0.9377)-1)*100 ≈ 6.0% 
32Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, corresponding to the other figures, give significant 
difference at the 1 percent level for the following cases; 3b, 5b, 7b, 8b and 9. The 
opportunity sets in fig. 6b, is not significantly different, at any reasonable significance 
level. The opportunity sets in figure 4b is significantly different at the 5 percent 
significance level. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  31 
low than when he/she has a high level of effort. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test confirms a significant difference in the distributions, at the 1 percent 
significance level, depending on whether the mother received social 
assistance. Below the average income, the equality of the distributions is 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level. Above the average, the equality 
of the distributions is rejected at the 10 percent significance level. 
 
Other circumstances can be analyzed in the same manner. If only a few 
individuals have the same circumstances, then this can cause problems as 
there will be too few individuals to illustrate indirect opportunity sets. This 
is also the reason why the whole of the first decile is included instead of 
just a percentile. 
 
5.4 Are unobserved circumstances included in effort? 
 
The opportunity sets are estimated using a finite number of observable 
circumstances and it is, of course, possible that important circumstances 
are left out. If this is the case, the analysis would then assign too much of 
the difference in income to differences in effort. To get an idea of whether 
important circumstances are missing in the analysis, it is possible to use 
information on siblings. Siblings have, in the literature, been used to 
capture whether shared family and community factors are important for a 
socioeconomic outcome.
33 A high correlation for the outcome variable 
between the siblings would suggest that shared factors are important. 
 
To see whether important circumstances are missing, wage regressions are 
estimated for both siblings, using the observed circumstances. If all 
important circumstances are included in the analysis, the correlation of the 
residuals for two same sex siblings would be very close to zero. The 
                                                                 
33See Solon, G. (1999) for a survey. 
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reason is that the observed circumstances would remove the grounds for 
correlation. To investigate this issue, each individual is matched with the 
eldest of his/her social siblings. The reason for matching the eldest siblings 
is to, as far as possible, exclude siblings who are still in education instead 
of in the labor market. To be identified as a social sibling, the individual 
and the sibling have to be living in the family home in 1970, and 1975. 
Further, only brothers are matched to the male sample, and only sisters are 
matched to the female sample. 
 
The OLS model above is estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) with almost the same equation for the brother and the sister. The 
only differences in the regressions are the addition of age and age-squared, 
to remove the effects of different ages, for the siblings. The residuals from 
both the estimations are then compared. 
 
Table 4 illustrates that substantial correlation
34 persists even after 
eliminating variation due to the observed circumstances. This applies for 
both the male and female samples, and for both labor income and 
disposable income. Accordingly, the opportunity sets, based on the 
observed circumstances, are sorting too much of the variation in incomes 
into the effort category. The reason is that the siblings have unobserved 
shared characteristics that influence the income. This means that the 
opportunity sets give too optimistic pictures of the true possibilities to 
influence the income with different degrees of effort. 
 
                                                                 
34This is the simple correlation coefficient. In the literature on sibling correlation, the 
estimates are usually components of income variation that, within a model, can be 
interpreted as correlation. Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  33 
 
 
Table 4 also reveals that the correlation between the residuals of the labor 
income of the brothers does not seem to vary when the sample is sorted 
into five quintiles according to the parents' income. This indicates, in the 
context of the model, that different opportunity sets are missing important 
circumstances in a similar fashion. In the case of disposable income, the 
correlation in some quintiles seems to be lower, which indicates that the 
opportunity set is less affected by unobserved circumstances, and is closer 
to being based on preferences. It is, however, important to note that none 
of the quintiles is particularly close to indicating that the circumstances 
included are sufficient. For all quintiles, there seem to be important 
circumstances that are missing in the analysis. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Theories of equality of opportunities distinguish between preferences and 
circumstances that the child is unable to influence. Roemer (1998) 
suggests in his theory, that income differences due to preferences that have 
developed out of circumstances should also be considered as inequality of 
opportunity. The theory argues that it is possible to control for 
circumstances and the residual variation is assigned to a "catch-all" term 
Table 4. Brothers and sisters correlations 
Sample Measure  Number  of Correlation
Correlation in different quintiles  
of parents' incomes 
      sibling pairs   1  2  3  4  5 
Male  Labor  income  15257  0.1396       
  Residual    15170  0.1222  0.1106 0.1063 0.1394 0.1343 0.1305 
  Disposable  inc.  16154  0.2008       
  Residual    16055  0.1771  0.1672 0.1340 0.1323 0.2189 0.2051 
Female  Labor  income  12851  0.1286       
  Residual    12741  0.1130  0.1067 0.1469 0.0996 0.0848 0.1284 
  Disposable  inc.  13527  0.1453       
  Residual    13401  0.1406  0.1179 0.097 0.0928  0.1076  0.2101 
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called effort, which is based on preferences. Investigating this empirically, 
by sorting the population into discrete groups would, however, quickly 
result in a problem of groups with too few individuals when controlling for 
a greater number of circumstances. At the same time, it is important to 
take into account a broad range of circumstances, since the rest of the 
variation of income would be sorted into the "catch-all" term called effort. 
If circumstances that are not included are important, this "catch-all" term 
would not be based on preferences. In this study, this practical problem is 
handled within the model, and the individuals are analyzed as if they had 
the same circumstances, apart from the one that is being analyzed. Indirect 
opportunity sets are illustrated and analyzed for both a male and a female 
sample in Sweden. The opportunity sets illustrate how different 
circumstances require different amounts of effort to reach the average 
income. An additional analysis of siblings does, however, reveal that the 
opportunity sets are incomplete and too much of the variation in income is 
sorted into effort. With a limited set of circumstances the "catch-all" term 
does indeed catch too much. At the same time, the opportunity sets also 
illustrate how different circumstances reward individuals making the same 
degree of effort differently. 
 
With a semiparametric model, it is possible to investigate whether the 
relation between the income of the parents and that of the adult child is 
nonlinear. In this study, the elasticity does not vary in a systematic pattern 
that would support nonlinearity. One interpretation is that low income 
parents can invest optimally in the human capital formation of their 
children, and the observed relation has to be explained by other 
hypotheses. It is, however, possible that there are investment constraints, 
and other explanations exist for the correlation of incomes for middle and 
high income parents. With respect to Swedish ambitions with, for 
example, a public education system without school fees or tuition charges, 
it seems that the institutions that allow access to education have reduced Opportunities, Preferernces and Incomes  35 
the importance of the household budget for human capital formation. 
Despite this, the correlation between the parents' income and that of the 
adult children is still present. Investigating the disposable income, instead 
of the labor income, reduces the connection for the circumstances. For the 
female sample, some of the circumstances do not seem to matter at all for 
the disposable income in adulthood. 
 
One way to extend the analysis would, of course, be to add more 
circumstances and see whether the opportunity sets for parents' incomes 
change. There are, however, practical difficulties. These extra 
circumstances, for example, may not be included in the data set, or they 
may be difficult to measure. One such circumstance, that has been briefly 
mentioned but not investigated in the empirical part, is innate abilities. The 
income correlation among siblings only reflects shared factors. Since 
innate abilities are only partly shared, this most likely means that the 
opportunity sets are even more incomplete than indicated. One way to 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1 Econometrical details 
 
The description of the econometric model is not explained in detail. 
Robinson (1988) is recommended for a more comprehensive presentation 
of the method. However, since the V SPz is used to estimate the 
confidence bands for the elasticity, it is reasonable to explain this part. The 

































































SP I R R Cov σ β   
 
The variances that are used to estimated the confidence band for the 
elasticities of the nonparametric part are estimated as follows, (Ullah & 
Roy, 1998), 
 
 VSPz|zi  Z′zKzZz−1Z′zzZzZ′zKzZz−1   
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where, Zz is a n ∗ q  12 matrix 1 zi − z and z  KzKz,  















u is a vector of local linear squared residuals, yi
∗  ziSPz  ui. 
   
VSPz is thus estimated as if yi
∗ is correct, even though yi
∗ is an 
estimate in itself. The confidence bands in the figures are estimated as +/- 
two standard errors from each estimated SPz.  These confidence bands 
are accordingly underestimated. Interpretations should, thus, be done with 
caution. 
 
Through this paper a gaussian kernel is used, i.e. 
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8.2 Tables and figures  
 
Table A1. Estimates. Dependent variables in (ln) (average, 1994-99)    
Sample  Male         Female       
Dependent variable  Disposable  Labor    Disposable    Labor 
Variables income  income    income    income 
             
Combined annual income (ln),   fig. 7a  fig. 5a  fig. 8a    fig. 6a 
    father           
Social mother (1970, 1975, 1980) is  0.0391***  0.0807***  0.0158*    0.1093*** 
    biological mother  (0.0096)   (0.0238)  (0.0093)    (0.0266) 
Mother is foreign born  -0.0067  -0.0386*  -0.0017    -0.0469** 
  (0.0085)   (0.0209)  (0.0078)    (0.0220) 
Social father (1970, 1975, 1980) is   0.0723***  0.2109***  -0.0090    0.1572*** 
    biological father  (0.0138)   (0.0340)  (0.0127)    (0.0365) 
Father is foreign born  -0.0229***  -0.0198  -0.0192**    -0.0274 
  (0.0086)   (0.0211)  (0.0080)    (0.0227) 
Age of father 1971  -0.0020***  -0.0041***  -0.0016***    0.0010 
  (0.0003)   (0.0008)  (0.0003)    (0.0008) 
Child did not stay with   -0.0219***  -0.1046***  0.0356***    -0.1174*** 
    social parent 1985  (0.0056)   (0.0136)  (0.0041)    (0.0117) 
Number of social siblings   -0.0109***  -0.0201***  -0.0023    -0.0674*** 
  (0.0029)   (0.0071)  (0.0028)    (0.0078) 
Number of social sisters   -0.0026  -0.0052  0.0054    0.03313***
  (0.0029)   (0.0088)  (0.0033)    (0.0094) 
Father divorced    -0.0401***  0.0217  0.0032    -0.0727*** 
  (0.0090)   (0.0222)  (0.0085)    (0.0242) 
Owner (dummy = 1 if the owner   0.0182***  0.0291***  0.0152***    0.0810*** 
    of the home lives in household)  (0.0046)   (0.0112)  (0.0043)    (0.0120) 
Father received social   -0.0941***  -0.2953***  0.0179    -0.2508*** 
    assistance, 1983  (0.0135)   (0.0339)  (0.0128)    (0.0372) 
Father experienced unemployment   -0.0176**  -0.0573***  0.0036    -0.0328* 
    (dummy = 1)  (0.0072)   (0.0178)  (0.0067)    (0.0190) 
Combined annual income (ln),   0.1029***  0.1703***  0.0890***    0.0866 
    average in parish  (0.0219)   (0.0539)  (0.0205)    (0.0582) 
Share working, percent in parish     0.0019**  0.0086***  -0.0006    0.0024 
  (0.0009)   (0.0023)  (0.0009)    (0.0025) 
Female headed household with   -0.0028*  -0.0085*  0.0035*    -0.0069 
    a child, percent in parish  (0.0017)   (0.0043)  (0.0016)    (0.0046) 
Share of population in parish that   0.0030***  0.0027*  0.0011**    0.0015 
    was foreign citizen  (0.0006)   (0.0015)  (0.0006)    (0.0016) 
Owner of the home,   0.0005***  0.0004  0.0002    0.0003 
    percent in parish  (0.0002)   (0.0004)  (0.0001)    (0.0004) 
Poverty measure.      0.0014  0.0041  -0.0010    -0.0059 
  (0.0011)   (0.0028)  (0.0011)    (0.0030) 
          
N 42527  41293  39328    38261 
          
Note: Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1%-level are marked with 
*, ** and ***. Standard errors are included in the second row for each estimated parameter.  
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Table A2. Necessary effort to reach average income with different opportunities 
      Labor income    Disposable income 
      Male Female    Male Female 
Income percentile 25, father  52.8  54.7    64.7  62.6 
Income percentile 75, father  40.8  52.0    47.6  55.9 
Income percentile 25, parents  52.3  56.8    59.7  61.9 
Income percentile 75, parents  42.6  50.8    47.9  52.8 







Table A3. y**/mean at effort = 50 with different opportunities 
      Labor income    Disposable income 
      Male Female    Male Female 
Income percentile 25, father      0.980  0.939    0.918  0.937 
Income percentile 75, father     1.088  0.979    1.013  0.962 
Income percentile 25, parents  0.976  0.938    0.949  0.940 
Income percentile 75, parents  1.070  0.994    1.012  0.987 
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